Role and Goals of Lloyd George and Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference – Speech

20 Nov 2004

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This document covers part of the Board of Studies point regarding the role and goals of Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson at the Paris (Versailles) Peace Conference.

The 1919 Paris Peace Conference was conducted at the Palace of Versailles shortly – some would argue too shortly – after the conclusion of the First World War. The participants of this conference included then-British Prime Minister Lloyd George, his French counterpart, Premier Clemenceau, Italian President Orlando and US President Wilson. The defeated powers lacked representation at this conference.

The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, had been elected on the basis of his (party’s) slogans, such as “Make Germany pay”, and “Hang the Kaiser”. His actions were restricted by the public expectation, and the divided support of the Liberal Party and Conservatives in Britain, which had forced his dependence upon the Conservatives, despite holding a considerable majority for his coalition in December 1918. Popular support of a “harsh” peace against Germany was one of the leading factors behind his election, and this political insecurity domestically constrained his ability to negotiate.

French Premier, Clemenceau, similarly favoured a harsh peace, although the motivation differed from that held by Lloyd George and Britain.

Clemenceau, a figure who entered French politics in 1870, witnessed the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war soon after this entry. This event may be seen as a catalyst for the establishment of his anti-German sentiments which are so prevalent at the conclusion of the First World War, specifically, manifested at the Paris Peace Conference, in which Clemenceau was unyielding in his calls and demands for heavy reparations against Germany, and, ultimately, for the complete destruction of Germany both in an economic and military sense. The notion of a peace that would permit Germany any degree of self-determination in the years to follow was, to Clemenceau, something unacceptable.

Despite his misgivings against the German state, however, Clemenceau recognised the impossibility of achieving the utter destruction of Germany, regardless as to how much himself and the people he represented may desire this outcome. Having said that, the “peace” process presented an opportunity to France by which Germany could be temporarily neutered, both militarily and economically, allowing France at least a temporary reprieve, during which it could enjoy and exploit trade opportunities (amongst other things) which would not have been possible if Germany’s greater population and economic capabilities were permitted to flourish as their full potential would permit them to (as had previously been the case).

It was understood that such an advantage would only be temporary; whilst Germany could be weakened, it was only a matter of time before the nation reasserted itself, through the re-establishment of its economy, which Clemenceau desired to hinder by harsh reparations, and by the size of the population of Germany which would make this re-establishment possible.

For two reasons, then, it is clear exactly why Clemenceau desired the outcome he did: for France, a severe burden placed upon Germany by way of reparation terms would result not only in the financial support necessary for the reconstruction of post-World War One France – it would, perhaps just as importantly, hold Germany down, permitting the French people greater economic advantage in the years to come.

Clemenceau’s demands were clearly against those consistent with the ideals of a “just peace”, something that was clearly not in accord with Wilson’s fourteen points. Clemenceau, fully aware of this, said of Wilson’s points:

“Mr. Wilson bores me with his Fourteen Points. Why, Almighty God has only Ten Commandments!”

– Clemenceau regarded the fourteen points as contradictory to his goals, and the goals of his country.

Not that dissimilarly, Lloyd George likewise conflicted with Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the notion of a “just peace”, although his behaviours during the Peace Conference were significantly less anti-German than those exhibited by his French counterpart, Clemenceau.

Lloyd George’s goals are commonly surmised in five specific points upon which he wished to gain a concession from other participating parties. These concessions relate to:

1. The destruction of the German fleet;
2. The destruction of the German colonial empire;
3. An increase in British colonial interests and possessions, specifically those in the Middle East for the purposes of attaining oil resources;
4. The re-establishment of European trade, which had been interrupted by the war, and;
5. The prevention of any country, including France – or especially France – from dominating Europe.

The last point is perhaps the most significant, and conveys the misgivings held by Lloyd George towards the motive and activities of France even at the beginning of the Peace Conference.

Points one and two are in accordance with Clemenceau’s demands: the destruction of the German fleet is a move toward the destruction of Germany’s military capacity (albeit in a sphere which Britain wishes to dominate), and the destruction of colonial satellites under Germany’s possession assists both in the diminishing of the influence and power of the German empire, whilst simultaneously having a negative economic impact (although not an impact as severe as Clemenceau would desire) upon Germany.

Point three, relating to the expansion of British colonial interests, can be seen as another motive behind Lloyd George’s support of the destruction of Germany’s colonial possessions: by attaining more colonies through the reparations levied against Germany.

Lloyd George’s fourth point, pertaining to the re-establishment of trade, is in contradiction to Clemenceau’s goals of utterly crushing the German nation in an economic sense; the ‘re-establishment of trade’ encompasses trade with Germany, also.

Britain had become increasingly suspicious of the motives of France, and the final concession Lloyd George wished to achieve ensured that France’s position could not become one of negative dominance over Europe.

Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau aimed at an outcome beneficial only to their interests, showing little concern for the notion put forward by Wilson of a “just peace”. This, combined with the timing of the conference so soon after the war, and the location of the conference – Versailles, centre of anti-German sentiment – lead to an outcome which was unable to simultaneously appease Germany and quell French security fears.

• McCallum, Anne, Evidence of War: Studying the First World War through Sources. Rigby Heinemenn, 1996.
• O’Brien, Carolyn and Merritt, Alan, 1914-1918: The World at War. Heinemann Educational, 1991.
• Guest, Vic, Eshuys, Joe and Lawrence, Judith, World War I: Causes, Course and Consequences. Macmillan Education, 1990.
• “Aftermath of World War I” Wikipedia. 2004.
  Accessed 14 Nov. 2004 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aftermath_of_World_War_I>.